

This paper explores how the identity and power dynamics within rebel alliances during civil wars influence the types of power-sharing institutions that emerge after conflict. I examine how the composition of rebel alliances, categorized as either heterogeneous or homogeneous based on shared identity, interacts with their power dynamics to shape the trajectory of post-conflict power-sharing. I theorize that alliances with balanced power structures, such as those between the NSF and Lebanese Forces in Lebanon or the FARC and ELN in Colombia, will result in either inclusive institutions if united by a shared identity, or protracted conflict if fragmented. Conversely, alliances with unbalanced power, such as those led by hegemony like ISIS in Syria or the Taliban in Afghanistan, will produce either exclusive institutions when alliances are heterogeneous or no power-sharing whatsoever when alliances are homogeneous. This is a research design stage work that uses large-numbers of quantitative analysis.